Summary Analysis Glaucon asks Socrates whether justice belongs 1 in the class of good things we choose to have for themselves, like joy, or 2 those we value for their consequences though they themselves are hard, like physical training, or 3 the things we value for themselves and their consequences, like knowledge. Socrates says justice is in the third and best group. Glaucon says that most people would say justice is valued not for itself but for its consequences, for justice is difficult, and thus often avoided.
The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment. You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule?
Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace? And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves.
And not being ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable.
Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help--not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good.
For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one.
So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character.
Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer? I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered. Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?
Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me. Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?
Most certainly, he replied. If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.
Very good, he said. And which method do I understand you to prefer? That which you propose. Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?political temperance= the agreement between naturally worse and better about who should be ruling and ruled attributed to = gaurdians, auxiliaries, and craftsmen Explain what political justice is.
Plato is surely right to think that there is some interesting and non-accidental relation between the structural features and values of society and the psychological features and values of persons, but there is much controversy about whether this relation really is strong enough to sustain all of the claims that Socrates makes for it in the Republic .
Socrates’ metaphysical argument contends that the natural world is not morally indifferent or neutral, as Glaucon’s social contract theory supposes, and human nature is not simply avaricious and competitive. Socrates' Function Argument in the Agreement and Disagreement Between Glaucon and Socrates PAGES 4.
WORDS View Full Essay. More essays like this: Not sure what I'd do without @Kibin - Alfredo Alvarez, student @ Miami University.
Exactly what I needed. - Jenna Kraig, student @ UCLA. Socrates' response to Glaucon (filling most of books ii-iv) is, in effect, a response to Thrasymachus also.
At the beginning of book II, Glaucon distinguishes three kinds of good (b-c), and Socrates admits that in his view justice is an example of the "finest" kind. (da2) State Socrates' views in the early part of the Republic in several . Glaucon asks Socrates to describe what justice and injustice each do in themselves, how justice benefits those who have justice and how injustice harms them.
Glaucon and Adeimantus want Socrates to describe the pure qualities of justice and injustice.